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The following observations constitute a preliminary and 
provisional response to two recent events: the murder 
of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, and the American 
assault on Fallujah, both of which prompt broader 
reflections on issues pertaining to violence and religion. 
1. If war is the continuation of politics by other means, as von Clause-
witz observed, violence is the continuation of conflict by means of 
physical force. Understanding the causes of violence thus involves 
two questions: a) What are the causes of conflict (in general and 
specific)? b) Why is it that a given conflict was not resolved—or not 
resolvable—by other means?
2. Some violence is the product of psychopathology: paranoia, sad-
ism, wildly displaced rage, and the like. Violence of this sort ac-
counts for a very small portion of the total and holds relatively little 
theoretical interest. The designation of violence as irrational, how-
ever, is attractive to certain theorists and policy-makers since it re-
moves such acts from the realm of the comprehensible and relieves 
them of the responsibility to have prevented or understood them. 
3. Most conflict is caused by competition over scarce resources. Vio-
lence represents the attempt to resolve such conflict to one’s own 
(individual or collective) benefit against the determined resistance 
of an adversary. 
4. The resources most often and most bitterly contested include not 
only material desiderata—above all, wealth, power, and territory—
but also such non-material items as prestige (the respect of others), 
dignity (the capacity for self-respect), and justice (or at least the 
sense of having been treated justly). This latter set is more diffuse 
and harder to quantify than the material desiderata, and as a result 
such considerations tend to be analytically undervalued. Nonethe-
less, they have enormous importance, especially when the mald-
istribution of material goods is compounded (also facilitated and 
legitimated) by non-material maldistributions.
5. Crossing the threshold from non-violent to violent conflict involves 
a qualitative leap that can be difficult to accomplish, particularly if 
it is motivated only by material desires. Normally, the naked pur-
suit of self-interest is perceived and defined as greed, not only by 
observers, but also by those who experience such temptation. To 
reveal oneself as motivated by greed calls forth sanctions. These 
include the loss of non-material assets (reputation, trust, self-re-
spect, et al.) that seriously offsets potential material gains, thereby 
inhibiting the move to violence.
6. Insofar as a sense of suffering non-material maldistribution also 
entails a sense of having been wronged, would-be aggressors be-
come able to define their violent acts as not just greedy, but mor-
ally justified. The discourses they develop and circulate toward that 
end may be intended to persuade others, but above all they help 
overcome their own subjective (i.e. moral) inhibitions. 
7. Certain kinds of religious discourse can assist in this task, specifi-
cally those which recode otherwise problematic acts as righteous 
deeds, sacred duties or the like, as when killing is defined as sacri-
fice, destruction as purification, or war as Crusade.
8. In principle, no religious tradition is more inclined than any other 
to make arguments of this sort. All people are capable of this move 
and the canonic texts of all religions include passages that can be 
put to such purpose. Those who are interested in undertaking vio-
lence can always find arguments and precedents that sanctify their 
purpose, but selective reading and tendentious interpretation are 
an important part of this process.
9. When social groups constitute their identity in religious terms 
and experience themselves as a sacred collectivity (the faithful, 
the righteous, or God’s chosen people, for instance), as a corollary 
they tend to construe their rivals in negative fashion (heretics, in-
fidels, apostates, evil, bestial, demonic, satanic, etc.). Under such 
circumstances, the pursuit of self-interest—including vengeance 
for slights to one’s pride (a.k.a. “honour”) — can be experienced as 
a holy cause, in support of which any violence is justified.
10. The factors that determine whether a group will embark on vio-
lent action include the extent to which it feels itself to have been 
wronged; the extent to which it experiences those wrongs as un-
bearable and intractable; and its ability to define itself and its cause 
as righteous, even sacred. 
11. Religious considerations are never the sole determining factor and 
there is no necessary relation between religion and violence. In 
most instances, religious considerations probably help to inhibit 
violence. But when religious discourse, authority, or communal 
identity are deployed in such a way as to facilitate the leap from 
non-violent to violent conflict, they can be enormously effective in 
accomplishing what Kierkegaard called “the religious suspension 
of the ethical.”
12. In such moments, religion can help disadvantaged groups to gain 
a more equitable division of the world’s resources by unleashing 
violence (or the threat thereof ) that helps them overcome the re-
sistance of their better-situated adversaries. 
13. The ugliest, most dangerous situations of all are not those in which 
the disadvantaged turn violent, believing they enjoy divine favour. 
Worse still are episodes in which groups who already enjoy dispro-
portionate power (and other resources) persuade themselves that 
religious injunctions, like the need to convert the heathen or the 
need to spread “freedom,” justify use of their superior force against 
disadvantaged others, construing such aggression as benevolent, 
meritorious, or holy.
14. Just as the use of violence tends to elicit a violent riposte, so the 
religious valorization of violence prompts its victims to frame their 
violent responses in religious terms. In doing so, they normally 
invert the signs through which their adversaries mark one side as 
sacred and the other, profane. When both sides experience their 
struggle in religious terms, the stage is set for prolonged, ferocious, 
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